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THE MOST DIFFICULT ADA REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION ISSUES: REASSIGNMENT AND
LEAVE OF ABSENCE
Stephen F. Befort*
The Americans with Disabilities Act obligates employers to pro-
vide reasonable accomodations to disabled workers as a means
of enabling those workers to perform essential job duties. Of all
the accomodations contemplated by the ADA, leaves of absence
and reassignment to another position pose the most trouble-
some legal and human resource issues. These two types of ac-
comodations do not merely tweak the job that a disabled em-
ployee is asked to perform, but instead excuse such employees
from performing their original job assignment. While facilitat-
ing disabled employees to remain gainfully employed, these ac-
comodations impose significant burdens on both employers and
fellow employees. This Article discusses a number of legal is-
sues currently in dispute concerning these two accomodations,
and recommends several policy-based solutions that would aid
in defining the appropriate contours of the reasonable accomo-
dation duty.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) turns ten years old
in 2002.1 The statute, although enacted with widespread support, "
has spawned a deluge of litigation.3 This litigation explosion reflects
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. The author
thanks Tracey Holmes Donesky and Brian J. Saame for their assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994). The ADA went into effect with respect to employers with twenty-five or
more employees on July 26, 1992, and with respect to employers with between
fifteen and twenty-four employees on July 26, 1994. See id. § 12111(5)(A); U.S.
EQUAL EPLOYAMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, A TECHNICAL. ASSIST.NCE
MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF TIHE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 1-10.3 (1992) [hereinafter TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANALI.
2. The ADA passed both houses of Congress by wide margins. The House
of Representatives passed the ADA with a vote of 403-20. 136 Cost;. REc.
11466-67 (1990). The Senate voted to approve the ADA with a margin of 76-8.
135 CONG. REC. 19903 (1989).
3. See EEOC, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges, FY
1992-FY 2000, available at httpJ/www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (last
modified Feb. 22, 2002) (reporting that 158,280 charges have been filed under
439
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a broad diversity in judicial construction of the ADA and, in turn,
has influenced the Supreme Court to issue eight decisions interpret-
ing the act over a brief span between 1998 and 2001.'
In an earlier article, a co-author and I argued that both the liti-
gation explosion and the judicial dissonance phenomenon resulted,
in part, from the fact that the ADA's anti-discrimination formula
differed from that of other federal anti-discrimination statutes.6
Under Title VII, for example, an employer is prohibited from dis-
criminating "because of' an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 6 The ADA's anti-discrimination formula is more
complicated in two significant respects. First, only individuals who
have a qualifying "disability" have standing to assert a claim under
the ADA.7 Second, in ascertaining whether an employer is acting
with discrimination under the ADA, the statute asks whether the
employee is qualified for the job "with or without reasonable ac-
commodation.'
Much of the litigation that has arisen under the ADA has in-
volved these two unique ADA provisions. During the ADA's first
decade, disputes concerning the breadth of the "disability" definition
occupied center stage. Five of the Supreme Court's eight decisions
have dealt with this issue.9
As the Supreme Court has clarified who is disabled for purposes
of the ADA, the focus of attention now is shifting to the reasonable
accommodation provision. The Supreme Court, in 2001, decided its
the ADA from the act's effective date in 1992 through September 30, 2001).
4. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ.
of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.
555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys.
Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Pa. Dep't of
Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
5. See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil:
Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability
Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 68-71 (1999).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The ADEA uses similar language in banning
discrimination because of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994) ("It shall be unlaw-
ful for an employer to... discriminate against any individual... because of
such individual's age.").
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In contrast, Title VII does not impose any class
membership standing requirement. Anyone can assert a claim of discrimina-
tion under that statute. See Befort & Thomas, supra note 5, at 69.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Neither Title VII nor the ADEA impose any af-
firmative obligation on employers to assist employees in satisfactorily perform-
ing the essential functions of the job. These statutes, instead, merely invoke a
negative prohibition against discrimination. See Matthew Diller, Judicial
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
19, 40-44 (2000) (contrasting how the ADA employs a different treatment model
of discrimination while most anti-discrimination statutes employ a equal
treatment model of discrimination).
9. See Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 562-67; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521-25; Sutton,
527 U.S. at 481-94; Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 801-04; Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 630-48.
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first reasonable accommodation case" and accepted review of an-
other.11
Determining the scope of the reasonable accommodation re-
quirement is difficult in several respects. First, the notion of what
accommodation may be "reasonable" necessarily is imprecise. This
task becomes even more difficult since the ADA excuses employers
from undertaking even reasonable accommodations if they impose
an "undue hardship."" Both concepts employ fuzzy adjectives. Sec-
ond, the reasonable accommodation/undue hardship inquiry is fact
specific with respect to each individual employer. 3 An accommoda-
tion that may be reasonable for one employer may impose an undue
hardship on another. Finally, some critics see the reasonable ac-
commodation requirement as a form of affirmative action."' Al-
though I believe that significant differences exist between the rea-
sonable accommodation and affirmative action concepts,1 some
courts have declined to require accommodations that they view as
providing preferential treatment for the disabled. 6
While reasonable accommodation issues are problematic in gen-
eral, the most difficult accommodation issues involve reassignments
and leaves of absence. A "reassignment," for purposes of the ADA,
involves the transfer of a current employee to a different, vacant po-
sition with the same employer.' 7 A "leave of absence" refers to an
employer's grant of a temporary period of absence from the work-
force accompanied with an expectation that the employee will return
to the same employment position. 8 These accommodations involve a
10. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690-91 (2001) (holding that cer-
tain professional golf tournaments must permit a disabled golf professional to
ride in a golf cart so as to enable him to participate in the tournaments, and
that such a reasonable modification would not fundamentally alter the nature
of those events).
11. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 532 U.S. 970 (2001). The Barnett deci-
sion is discussed infra at notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
13. See id. § 12111(10); Befort & Thomas, supra note 5, at 70.
14. See CHARLEs R. LAWRENCE III & MAR! J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK:
MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 108 (1997) (referring to the ADA as
"the most radical affirmative action program in the nation's history"); Sandra R.
Levitsky, Reasonably Accommodating Race: Lessons from the ADA for Race-
Targeted Affirmative Action, 18 LAW & INEQ. 85, 85 (1999) (referring to the ADA
as imposing an affirmative action requirement).
15. Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Ac-
tion, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1045, 1086 (2000) (stating that "al-
though similarities can be drawn between affirmative action and reasonable ac-
commodation, significant differences justify keeping the two concepts
separate").
16. See, e.g., EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th
Cir. 2000); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995).
17. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2001).
18. See generally EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommoda-
tion and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC
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greater restructuring of the work environment than do other types
of reasonable accommodations and place more burdens on employers
and co-employees."
This Article attempts a critical analysis of the reassignment and
leave of absence accommodations. The Article does so initially by
examining the regulatory and judicial debate concerning the proper
application of these accommodations. It then goes on to make a
number of suggestions designed to reduce the uncertainty currently
surrounding these two accommodations.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the reasonable ac-
commodation requirement under the ADA. Part II explores the rea-
sons why reassignments and leaves of absence, among all the possi-
ble types of accommodation for the disabled, have fueled the most
controversy. Part III discusses the reassignment accommodation in
particular and reviews the four issues on which the circuit courts
and/or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
have reached differing viewpoints. Part IV similarly discusses the
leave of absence accommodation and summarizes the uncertain
state of the case law. Part V then suggests more predictable guide-
lines for determining the appropriate applications of these two types
of accommodations.
I. THE REASONABLE ACCOMODATION REQUIREMENT
A- The Role of Reasonable Accommodation.
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individ-
ual with a disability.""0 The ADA's discrimination prohibition differs
from that of other employment discrimination statutes, however, in
that it requires an employer to gauge an employee's qualifications
only after providing a reasonable accommodation designed to assist
the employee's performance.2 The ADA defines a "qualified individ-
Compliance Manual (CCH) 6908, at 5435, 5447-48 (Mar. 1, 1999); available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/acco-mmodation.html [hereinafter Enforcement Guid-
ance].
19. See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). An individual has a "disability" for pur-
poses of the ADA if he or she has "a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual." Id. §
12102(2)(A).
21. The reasonable accommodation requirement is unique to disability law.
In addition to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, applicable only to fed-
eral employees, contractors, and grant recipients, included a similar reasonable
accommodation requirement. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-96 (1994). With the exception of
persons claiming discrimination on the basis of religion, neither Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j), nor ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, entitles persons protected by
either statute to demand accommodations in their favor. The Supreme Court
has construed the reasonable accommodation requirement for religion very nar-
rowly, holding that an employer need not incur more than a de minimus hard-
ship in providing an accommodation for religious purposes. TWA, Inc. v. Hardi-
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ual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential func-
tions of the employment position that such individual holds or de-
sires."' This definition requires employers to engage in a two-step
inquiry: (1) identify the essential functions of the job in question and
(2) determine whether the individual can perform those essential
functions with or without reasonable accommodation.'
The EEOC, the administrative agency charged with promulgat-
ing regulations to implement the statutory language of the ADA,2'
defines "essential functions" as the "fundamental job duties" of the
employment position, but excludes those functions that are merely
"marginal" in nature.& The regulations state that a job function
may be considered essential because the position exists to perform
that function, only a limited number of employees are available to
perform the job function, and/or the function involves a high degree
• • 26
of specialization.
Once the essential functions of the position are identified, the
employer next must ask whether the disabled individual can per-
form these essential functions without reasonable accommodation.
If the answer is in the affirmative, then the individual is "qualified"
under the statute.7 If the answer is in the negative, then the em-
ployer has an affirmative obligation to provide the individual with a
reasonable accommodation, unless doing so would cause the em-
ployer to suffer an undue hardship.'
B. Types of Reasonable Accommodation
Reasonable accommodation is defined generally as "any change
in the work environment or in the way things are customarily done
that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employ-
ment opportunities."' The ADA states that a reasonable accommo-
dation may include:
son, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
23. Befort & Thomas, supra note 5, at 35.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (stating that "the Commission shall issue regulations
in an accessible format to carry out this subchapter').
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2001).
26. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2). The ADA states that "if an employer has prepared a
written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job,
this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the
job." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
27. Befort & Thomas, supra note 5, at 35.
28. Id.; see Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2nd Cir.
1995) (stating that "the plaintiff bears the burden of proving either that she can
meet the requirements of the job without assistance, or that an accommodation
exists that permits her to perform the job's essential functions").
29. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work sched-
ules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modifi-
cation of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies,
the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 0
The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance states that "[tihis listing is
not intended to be exhaustive of accommodation possibilities."3
The range of contemplated ADA reasonable accommodations
may be grouped into five functional categories. They are:
1. Making changes to existing facilities. An employer's duty to
modify its facilities includes making both work and non-work areas
used by employees accessible to a disabled employee. 2 Modifications
to restrooms, break rooms, and lunchrooms thus may be required as
reasonable accommodations.3 3
2. Providing assistive devices or personnel. The statute lists the
"acquisition or modification of equipment or devices" and "the provi-
sion of qualified readers or interpreters" as reasonable accommoda-
tions.' The Interpretive Guidance further suggests that an em-
ployer may be required to permit a disabled employee to utilize his
or her own equipment or aids, such as a guide dog for an individual
who is blind, even though the employer itself may not be required to
provide such an accommodation.35
3. Job restructuring. This type of accommodation entails mak-
ing changes to an employee's current job.36 While an employer is not
required to reallocate essential job functions,37 an employer may
need to reallocate or redistribute nonessential, marginal job func-
tions that a qualified individual with a disability is unable to per-
form. 38 An employer also may be required to change when and how
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
31. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
35. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
36. See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(Silberman, J., dissenting) (explaining how job restructuring involves making
accommodations to a disabled employee in his current position).
37. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) ("An employer or other covered entity is not
required to reallocate essential functions.").
38. Id. The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance demonstrates this type of ac-
commodation by way of the following illustration:
444 [Vol. 37
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a job function is performed, such as by authorizing modified or part-
time work schedules.39
4. Reassignment to a vacant position. The reassignment ac-
commodation involves placing the disabled employee in a new posi-
tion. This type of accommodation goes a step beyond those listed
above in that, instead of making adjustments to enable an employee
to perform his or her current job, it transfers the disabled employee
to an entirely different job.
5. Leave of absence. Although not listed in the statute, both the
EEOC4° and the courts" recognize that a leave of absence may serve
as an additional type of reasonable accommodation. A leave of ab-
sence may enable a disabled employee, through rest and/or rehabili-
tation, to return to productive work.
C. The Interactive Process
The EEOC regulations state that, once an individual with a dis-
ability requests an accommodation, the employer should consult
with that employee in ascertaining an appropriate reasonable ac-
commodation.42 The regulations envision that the employer will ini-
tiate an "informal, interactive process" with a qualified applicant or
employee to "identify the precise limitations resulting from the dis-
ability and potential reasonable accommodations that could over-
come those limitations."'
The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance provides more detail as to
the suggested structure of this process. The Guidance states that it
should be a "flexible" process that involves "the individual assess-
ment of both the particular job at issue, and the specific physical or
[The] employer may have two jobs, each of which entails the perform-
ance of a number of marginal functions. The employer hires a quali-
fied individual with a disability who is able to perform some of the
marginal functions of each job but not all of the marginal functions of
either job. As an accommodation, the employer may redistribute the
marginal functions so that all of the marginal functions that the quali-
fied individual with a disability can perform are made a part of the
position to be filled by the qualified individual with a disability. The
remaining marginal functions that the individual with a disability
cannot perform would then be transferred to the other position.
Id.
39. See id. ("For example, an essential function customarily performed in
the early morning hours may be rescheduled until later in the day as a reason-
able accommodation to a disability that precludes performance of the function
at the customary hour.").
40. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5447-48.
4L See, e.g., Cehrs v. N.E. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775,
783 (6th Cir. 1998); Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 443 (1st Cir. 1998).
42. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9.
43. Id. § 1630.2(o)(3).
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mental limitations of the particular individual in need of reasonable
accommodation."" The Guidance goes on to recommend that the
parties jointly engage in a four-step "problem solving approach"
leading to the selection of "the accommodation that is most appro-
priate for both the employee and the employer.' 5
Some appellate court decisions suggest that independent liabil-
ity may exist under the ADA for a party who fails to participate in
the interactive process.46 Most courts, however, reject this position
and hold that liability will arise only where an employer has failed
as a matter of substance to identify and implement a reasonable ac-
commodation that would enable a disabled employee to perform
adequately in the workplace.7
D. The Undue Hardship Defense
The ADA excuses an employer from accommodating an individ-
ual with a disability if the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on that employer.4 8 The statute defines undue hardship as
"an action requiring significant difficulty or expense,"' and provides
a list of factors to consider in determining whether the proposed ac-
44. Id. app. § 1630.9.
45. Id. The regulations state:
When a qualified individual with a disability has requested a rea-
sonable accommodation to assist in the performance of a job, the em-
ployer, using a problem solving approach, should:
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its
purpose and essential functions;
(2) Consult with the individual with a disability to ascertain
the precise job-related limitations imposed by the individual's
disability and how those limitations could be overcome with a
reasonable accommodation;
(3) In consultation with the individual to be accommodated,
identify potential accommodations and assess the effectiveness
each would have in enabling the individual to perform the essen-
tial functions of the position; and
(4) Consider the preference of the individual to be accommo-
dated and select and implement the accommodation that is most
appropriate for both the employee and the employer.
Id.
46. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 162 (3rd Cir.
1999); Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (7th Cir.
1996).
47. See, e.g., Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir.
2000); Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 196 F.3d 979, 993-94 (9th Cir. 1998); Willis v.
Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997); cf Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of
Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that an employer's failure
to engage in the interactive process constitutes prima facie evidence of bad faith
sufficient to deny an employer's motion for summary judgment).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994) (stating that an employer does not
violate the ADA for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation if the em-
ployer "can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on the operation of the business of such covered entity").
49. Id. § 12111(10)(A).
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commodation would cause a particular employer to suffer an undue
hardship."0 Unless this defense is shown to exist, an employer's
failure to provide an accommodation that is available and reason-
able results in a violation of the statute. 1
II. THE MOST DIFFICULT ACCOMODATIONS
Of all the accommodations listed in the ADA, the reassignment
and leave of absence accommodations have proven to be the most
difficult. These two types of accommodations require a greater de-
gree of workplace reorganization and impose extra burdens on both
employers and fellow workers.
The other types of accommodations recognized under the ADA"
involve relatively minor adjustments that enable a disabled em-
ployee to remain in his or her current position. Changes made to ex-
isting facilities and the provision of assistive devices, for example,
may impact the manner in which work is performed, but generally
50. Id. § 12111(10)(B) provides:
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an un-
due hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include-
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under
this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities
involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the
number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on ex-
penses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommo-
dation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the
overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the
number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its fa-
cilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure, and functions of the work-
force of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative,
or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the
covered entity.
See also Befort & Thomas, supra note 5, at 37 ("describ[ing) the undue hardship
defense as a floating concept that varies with the nature and cost of the pro-
posed accommodation, the impact of the proposed accommodation upon the op-
eration of the facility, and the overall resources of both the facility in question
and the employer in general").
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (defining discrimination under the ADA to
include "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or men-
tal limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee."). The federal courts of appeal are split as to the requi-
site burdens of proof in establishing a reasonable accommodation. Compare
Barnett, 196 F.3d at 988-89 (holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of per-
suasion to show both the existence and reasonableness of a proposed accommo-
dation), with Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 98 (2nd Cir. 1997)
(holding that the plaintiff need only establish the existence of a plausible ac-
commodation with the defendant then bearing the burden of proving that the
proposed accommodation is unreasonable).
52. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
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do not alter the quantity and quality of such work. These accommo-
dations impose some obligations on the employer but have no imme-
diate impact on non-disabled co-employees.53 Similarly, job restruc-
turing involves making adjustments for a disabled employee in his
current position that, again, would have little impact upon the
rights of other employees.' Although an employer's reallocation of
marginal functions may alter some of the tasks performed by other
employees in the workplace, such an accommodation does not neces-
sarily result in a net increase of work duties for non-disabled em-
ployees." Thus, with respect to each of these accommodations, the
disabled employee continues to perform the essential duties of his or
her assigned job. The employer reaps the benefit of the work that is
performed, and fellow employees are not burdened with the realloca-
tion of any essential duties.
In contrast, reassignment and leaves of absence remove the dis-
abled employee from his or her current position. A reassignment
places the employee in a new position that invariably entails differ-
ent duties than that which the employee performed in the previous
position. A leave of absence temporarily removes the employee from
the workforce altogether. In short, these accommodations necessi-
tate a greater reshuffling of the workplace environment.
This reshuffling imposes greater burdens on employers and co-
workers than do the other types of accommodation recognized by the
ADA. For the employer, the reassignment and leave of absence ac-
commodations mean that it will not receive the work effort of em-
ployees who are trained and experienced in their current positions.
The employer will need to identify and train a new worker to per-
form these tasks. Reassignment additionally limits an employer's
discretion in filling vacant positions, while a leave of absence adds
the uncertainty of when the disabled worker will be able to return to
work. These accommodations, accordingly, detrimentally affect
management's overall flexibility and productivity.
These two accommodations also impose burdens on fellow
employees. A reassignment mandated by the ADA may translate
into a tangible loss for other employees because the placement of a
disabled employee into a vacant position necessarily deprives other
employees of the possibility of filling that position. 6 A leave of ab-
53. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1314 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1314-15 (observing that "'job restructuring' and 'part-time and
modified work schedules' involve accommodations [of an employee's current po-
sition and] have no direct effect on non-disabled employees or applicants").
55. The reallocation is a trade-off of marginal job functions between the
disabled and non-disabled employee: the non-disabled employee picks up those
marginal functions that the disabled employee cannot perform and the disabled
employee picks up those functions that he or she can perform from the non-
disabled employee. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
56. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1315 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (noting that, in
contrast to other types of accommodations listed in the ADA, reassignment in-
[Vol. 37
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sence may necessitate the transfer of a co-worker to perform the
functions of the absent, disabled employee. The transferred em-
ployee not only must learn how to perform new work tasks, but faces
the prospect of being "bumped" upon the disabled employee's re-
turn.
5 7
The reassignment accommodation also poses a unique addi-
tional problem. The reassignment obligation is a duty that was not
recognized prior to the adoption of the ADA. Although the ADA
closely tracks the statutory language of the Rehabilitation Act of
19738 and its interpretive case law,59 the ADA departs from its older
statutory sibling by expressly including "reassignment to a vacant
position" in its list of reasonable accommodations.' The Rehabilita-
tion Act required reassignment only if it was available under an
employer's existing policies." Otherwise, reassignment was a per-
missible, but not a required, accommodation.' The lack of clearly
delineated standards for reassigning qualified individuals vith dis-
abilities under the Rehabilitation Act may explain some of the cur-
rent struggle that the federal courts are experiencing in defining the
scope of this new ADA accommodation.'
fringes on the rights of non-disabled employees).
57. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5447 (discussing the
right of a disabled employee to return to his or her former position at the end of
a leave of absence).
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-96 (1994).
59. GARY PHELAN & JANET BOND ATHERTON, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN
THE WORKPLACE § 1:06 (1997) (indicating that the ADA was closely modeled on
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1994) (listing "reassignment to a vacant posi-
tion" as a reasonable accommodation).
61. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987)
(summarizing reassignment duty under the Rehabilitation Act). In Arline, the
Supreme Court stated:
Employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable
accommodation for a handicapped employee. Although they are not
required to find another job for an employee who is not qualified for
the job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an employee alternative
employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer's
existing policies.
Id.; see also Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12
(2001).
62. Jeffrey S. Berenholz, Note, The Development of Reassignment to a Va-
cant Position in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 15 HOFSTRA L XB. & EMP.
L.J. 635, 639-40 (1998).
63. Nevertheless, Congress clearly intended to go beyond the Rehabilitation
Act by expressly providing in the text of the ADA that reasonable accommoda-
tion may include "reassignment to a vacant position." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
Congress's commitment to reassignment as an accommodation for the disabled
was further evidenced when Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1992
to expressly include reassignment as an accommodation. See 29 U.S.C. §§
791(g), 794(d), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-569, Title V, § 503, 106 Stat. 4360
(1992).
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III. REASSIGNMENT
A- EEOC Guidelines on Reassignment
The EEOC has issued several interpretive aids that provide
guidance concerning the scope of the reassignment accommodation.
These include formal regulations,' the Interpretive Guidance of Ti-
tle I,65 Technical Assistance Manual," and Enforcement Guidance on
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship (Enforcement
Guidance).67 Taken together, these guidelines establish a number of
basic principles that courts generally have accepted as establishing
the parameters of the reassignment accommodation. 8
First, "[r]eassignment is the reasonable accommodation of last
resort."69 The Enforcement Guidance, for example, provides that re-
assignment "is required only after it has been determined that: (1)
there are no effective accommodations that will enable the employee
to perform the essential functions of his/her current position, or (2)
all other reasonable accommodations would impose an undue hard-
ship."70
Second, an employer is under no obligation to reassign a dis-
abled employee except to a position that is truly vacant.7' The En-
forcement Guidance defines a vacancy as a position that is either
available when the employee requests a reasonable accommodation
or one that the employer is aware will become available within a
reasonable time.7 ' The regulations further explain that a position is
considered vacant "even if an employer has posted a notice or an-
nouncement seeking applications for that position., 7' An employer is
not required to "bump" another employee in order to create a va-
cancy, nor is an employer required either to create a new position
for a disabled employee or to promote a disabled employee to a
64. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-1630.16 (2001).
65. Id. app. §§ 1630.1-1630.16.
66. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 1.
67. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18.
68. See John E. Murray & Christopher J. Murray, Enabling the Disabled:
Reassignment and the ADA, 83 MARQ. L. REv. 721, 731-32 (2000) (noting a con-
sensus among federal courts concerning certain steps that employers are not
obligated to take in order to comply with the reassignment requirement).
69. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5453; see also 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.2(o).
70. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5453; see also 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.2(o) (stating that "[iun general, reassignment should be considered only
when accommodation within the individual's current position would pose an
undue hardship").
71. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5453 (defining "vacant").
72. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2001) (suggesting that what
constitutes a reasonable amount of time should be determined in light of the
totality of the circumstances).
73. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5453.
74. Id. at 5453-54.
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higher graded position."
Third, even if the "vacancy" of a position is established, an em-
ployer need not reassign a disabled individual unless he or she is
"qualified" for the new position.6 Otherwise stated, the disabled
employee must demonstrate that he or she satisfies the requisite job
requirements and is capable of performing the position's essential
functions with or without reasonable accommodation.'
Fourth, as with all the accommodations listed in the ADA, an
employer is excused from the obligation of reassigning a disabled
employee if doing so would result in an undue hardship.'
Fifth, according to the Enforcement Guidance, a disabled em-
ployee gets the vacant position if he or she is qualified for it. " The
EEOC position is that an employer does not satisfy the reassign-
ment duty merely by permitting a disabled employee to compete
with others for a vacant position.'
B. Four Contentious Reassignment Issues
Courts have experienced considerable difficulty in determining
the reach of the reassignment accommodation. This difficulty is il-
lustrated by the fact that the circuit courts of appeal have reached
different conclusions with respect to four reassignment issues. Each
of these four issues is summarized below.
1. Is the reassignment accommodation available only to
disabled employees who are qualified to perform their current
job?
The Rehabilitation Act, prior to its 1992 amendments, did not
list reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommoda-
75. Id. An employer, however, may have a duty to reassign a disabled em-
ployee to a lower graded position as a reasonable accommodation. See 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(o) ("An employer may reassign an individual to a lower graded
position if there are no accommodations that would enable the employee to re-
main in the current position and there are no vacant equivalent positions for
which the individual is qualified with or without reasonable accommodation.").
76. See ENFORcEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5453.
77. See id.; see also Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678
(7th Cir. 1998). Dalton stated that in determining those positions for which a
disabled employee may be qualified:
[tihe employer must first identify the full range of alternative posi-
tions for which the individual satisfies the employer's legitimate, non-
discriminatory prerequisites, and then determine whether the em-
ployee's own knowledge, skills, and abilities would enable her to
perform the essential functions of any of those alternative positions,
with or without reasonable accommodations.
Id.
78. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing the undue
hardship defense).
79. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5455-56.
80. See id.
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tion. Cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act concluded that em-
ployers were not required to reassign a disabled employee who could
not perform the essential functions of his or her current position
unless such a transfer was consistent with the employer's existing
personnel policies."'
Some courts have continued to apply the Rehabilitation Act rule
under the ADA. In Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.," for example, a
Tenth Circuit panel initially held that the ADA did not obligate an
employer to reassign an employee who could not perform the essen-
tial functions of his or her current job.83 The Smith court noted that
the ADA is not designed to require employers to accommodate every
disabled employee, only those who are "qualified individuals" capa-
ble of still performing their current jobs in spite of their disabili-
ties.8 While Smith has been overturned by a June 1999 en banc rul-
ing,' other courts continue to adhere to this position.86
A majority of circuit courts now have reached the opposite con-
clusion and found that the ADA compels a different result with re-
spect to reassignment than did the pre-1992 Rehabilitation Act.
These courts find that reassignment to a vacant position is a rea-
sonable accommodation required under the ADA so long as the em-
ployee is qualified to perform the essential job functions of the posi-
tion desired for reassignment even though he or she no longer is
able to perform the essential functions of the current job." The per-
tinent legislative history appears to support this majority view-
point. 8
2. Is reassignment of a disabled employee required by the ADA
where such result would violate the seniority rights of another
employee under a collective bargaining agreement provision?
The EEOC, in both its Interpretive Guidance and the Technical
Assistance Manual, suggests that the terms of a collective bargain-
81. See, e.g., Bradley v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d
922, 925 (5th Cir. 1993); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244,
1251-52 (6th Cir. 1985).
82. 138 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1998).
83. Id. at 1308-09.
84. Id. at 1309.
85. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
86. See Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995); Cheatwood v. Roa-
noke Indus., 891 F. Supp. 1528, 1537 (N.D. Ala. 1995); Lang v. City of Maple-
wood, 574 N.W.2d 451, 454-55 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
87. See Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir.
2000); Jackan v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir.
2000); Smith, 180 F.3d at 1161, 1164-66; Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d
780, 786 (1st Cir. 1998); Aka, 156 F.3d at 1301; Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134
F.3d 576, 579-580 (3d Cir. 1998); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 498
(7th Cir. 1996).
88. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 345.
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ing agreement (CBA) may be relevant in determining whether an
accommodation would impose an "undue hardship."" This position
finds support in the ADA's legislative history, which indicates that
collective bargaining provisions are relevant, but not determinative,
on the reassignment issue.9°
In Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,9 however, the Seventh
Circuit adopted a per se rule that an employer is not required to vio-
late a seniority system agreed upon in a CBA in order to reassign a
disabled employee as a reasonable accommodation. " The majority
of circuit courts have now adopted this position. 3
At least two court decisions have rejected the per se approach in
favor of a balancing one. In Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.,' the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ruled that a
collective bargaining agreement should be a factor to consider when
determining "the reasonableness of the proposed accommodation,"
but that a per se rule should not apply to ADA cases.9 Similarly, in
Aka v. Washington Hospital Center," a panel of the D.C. Circuit
adopted a balancing standard that would weigh the need for an ac-
commodation with the degree of hardship imposed by the infringe-
ment on "seniority rights."97 The court noted that this balance
should be based on the particular circumstances of each case, with a
potential "continuum" of results. 9 The Aka decision subsequently
was vacated and decided en banc on different grounds."
3. Does the ADA require an employer to transfer a disabled
employee to a vacant position despite the superior qualifications
of another applicant or employee who also desires that position?
a. Cases in which the disabled employee prevailed.
i. Aka v. Washington Hospital Center."°° The plaintiff, Etim
89. See TEcHNIcALAsSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at §§ 3.9, 7.11.
90. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63.
91. 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996).
92. Id. at 1051.
93. See Lujan v. Pac. Mar. Ass'n., 165 F.3d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1999); Kralik
v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 82-83 (3rd Cir. 1997); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125
(10th Cir. 1995); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th
Cir. 1995).
94. 875 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
95. Id. at 396-97.
96. 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
97. Id. at 895-97.
98. Id. at 896.
99. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en
banc). The en banc decision is discussed infra at notes 100-09 and accompany-
ing text.
100. 156 F.3d at 1284.
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Aka, a 56-year-old Nigerian immigrant, had worked as an operating
room orderly at Washington Hospital Center for nineteen years be-
fore undergoing bypass surgery as a result of heart and circulatory
problems.01 After spending approximately six months in rehabilita-
tion, Aka's doctor told him he could return to work provided that his
job involved only "a 'light or moderate level of exertion."0 2 The
physical demands of Aka's job as an orderly did not meet this limita-
tion, so Aka requested a transfer "to a job that was compatible with
his medical restrictions."0 3 The hospital declined Aka's transfer re-
quest but permitted him to apply for future job postings.0 4 Aka ap-
plied for numerous positions within the hospital and, although he
"met the minimal qualifications for" these positions, he was rejected
each time in favor of a more qualified, non-disabled co-worker."'
In an en banc decision, the D.C. Circuit expressed the view that
reassignment under the ADA requires something more of an em-
ployer than simply allowing a disabled employee to compete equally
with other applicants for a vacant position.0 6 The court looked at
the ADA's statutory text and concluded that the natural meaning of
the word "reassign" necessarily implies the need for "some active ef-
fort on the part of the employer."" 7 The court, however, did not spec-
ify what type of "active effort" was necessary for an employer to
comply with the ADA's reassignment duty."8 Judge Silberman, in
dissent, disagreed stating "that a disabled employee is never enti-
tled to any more consideration for a vacant position than an ordi-
nary applicant, because according to the disabled employee any kind
of help would be a prohibited preference."10 9
ii. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc." 0 The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in this decision agreed with the D.C. Circuit in Aka that the
reassignment accommodation requires employers to do "something
more" than allow disabled employees to compete equally with other
job applicants."' The Smith court, however, went beyond Aka to de-
fine more precisely what "something more" entails by stating that:
"The disabled employee has a right in fact to the reassignment, and
not just to the consideration process leading up to the potential re-
101. Id. at 1286.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1287.
106. Id. at 1304.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1305.
109. Id. at 1304 (noting in the majority opinion that this argument was
made by the dissent).
110. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
111. Id. at 1180.
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assignment."1 12
To eliminate any doubt as to the majority's interpretation of the
statute, the opinion summarized an employer's reassignment obliga-
tion as follows:
The unvarnished obligation derived from the statute is
this: an employer discriminates against a qualified individual
with a disability if the employer fails to offer a reasonable ac-
commodation. If no reasonable accommodation can keep the
employee in his or her existing job, then the reasonable ac-
commodation may require reassignment to a vacant position so
long as the employee is qualified for the job and it does not im-
pose an undue burden on the employer. Anything more, such
as requiring the reassigned employee to be the best qualified
employee for the vacant job, is judicial gloss unwarranted by
the statutory language or its legislative history.'1
3
b. Cases Finding No Preference Required.
i EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc."' Nancy Houser started
work for the employer as a picker, a warehouse position requiring
employees to pick health and pharmaceutical products off an assem-
bly line.'15 She subsequently injured her right arm and was diag-
nosed later with tennis elbow." 6 Despite numerous accommoda-
tions, Houser became unable to perform the essential functions of
the picker position. 7 Houser then applied and was interviewed for
a total of eight office jobs within the company, but in each case, the
employer selected another employee to transfer into the position. "
In deciding for the employer, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals expressly rejected the EEOC's interpretation that a disabled
employee should be afforded a priority in filling vacant positions.",,
The Seventh Circuit, in a decision authored by Judge Posner, criti-
cized the EEOC's position as giving "bonus points" to individuals
with disabilities even where an employee's disability puts her at no
disadvantage in bidding for an open position.' Such a result, ac-
cording to Judge Posner, would constitute "affirmative action with a
vengeance." 2 ' The court, instead, concluded that: "[Tihe ADA does
not require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a job for
112. Id. at 1166.
113. Id. at 1169.
114. 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000).
115. Id. at 1026.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1026-27.
119. Id. at 1027. The EEOC's interpretation is discussed supra notes 79-80
and accompanying text.
120. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1027.
121. Id. at 1029.
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which there is a better applicant, provided it's the employer's consis-
tent and honest policy to hire the best applicant ... in question." '22
4. Does the ADA's reassignment accommodation compel
employers to make exceptions to non-discriminatory transfer and
assignment policies?
Similar issues arise when the reassignment of a disabled em-
ployee would conflict with a well-established, non-discriminatory
employer policy. The type of policy at issue here generally concerns
an employer's protocol for filling vacant positions. Examples of such
transfer and assignment policies are those that use either competi-
tive bidding or seniority as a preferential mechanism for selecting a
position's new occupant. On the one hand, interpreting the ADA so
as to require employers to treat disabled employees differently than
non-disabled employees by making an exception to such policies
looks like a preference in favor of the disabled and cuts against the
equal treatment model reflected in most anti-discrimination stat-
utes. On the other hand, the text, history, and purpose of the ADA
suggest that preferential treatment for the disabled not only may be
appropriate, it also may be required.
a. Cases in which disabled employee prevails.
i. Davoll v. Webb.'23 Several police officers employed by the
City of Denver were forced into retirement after disabling conditions
rendered them unable to perform their current jobs and a city-wide
policy against employee transfers precluded their placement into
other vacant positions.124 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed a jury verdict in favor of the officers and, relying heavily on
its holding in Smith, ruled that a "disabled employee has a right in
fact to the reassignment, and not just to the consideration process
leading up to the potential reassignment.""5 Thus, the city's failure
to reassign the plaintiffs, irrespective of an otherwise valid no-
transfer policy, was found to be discriminatory under the ADA.'2
ii. Ransom v. Arizona Board of Regents.'27 Eileen Ransom
worked for the University of Arizona as an administrative assistant
in the College of Nursing. '28 When Ransom's carpal tunnel and myo-
fascial pain syndrome worsened to the point where she was unable
to perform her word processing duties, she requested a reassign-
122. Id.
123. 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999).
124. Id. at 1125.
125. Id. at 1131-32.
126. Id. at 1134.
127. 983 F. Supp. 895 (D. Ariz. 1997).
128. Id. at 898.
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ment to a position with lighter word processing demands." This re-
quest, however, ran afoul of a policy requiring that "all employees,
including those with disabilities, must compete for job reassign-
ments through the competitive hiring process.""a Ransom was un-
able to secure another position through this process, and the Uni-
versity terminated her employment.'
3
'
The court held, as a matter of law, that the employer's competi-
tive reassignment policy violated the ADA.' 32 The court rejected the
University's contention that disabled employees are entitled to reas-
signment "only in the same way as an employer provides for reas-
signment of nondisabled employees."'" Instead, the court found that
the defendant's competitive transfer policy effectively prevents the
reassignment of disabled employees and, therefore, "discriminates
against 'qualified individuals with disabilities.'"'
b. Cases finding no preference required.
i Daugherty v. City of El Paso.'" Carl Daugherty worked as
a part-time city bus driver until he was diagnosed with insulin-
dependent diabetes.'36 Because the diabetes rendered him unable to
perform his current job, Daugherty sought reassignment to a differ-
ent full-time position. 3  Although the city charter governing reas-
signments gave him a preference because of his disability,
Daugherty was unable to secure another position because that same
policy gave full-time employees priority over part-time workers."
The city defended its policy on the ground that giving Daugherty, a
part-time employee, a full-time job would cause complaints from
other full-time employees who had been waiting for that position
and had more seniority than Daugherty.'"
The court agreed with the employer, concluding that the city
was not required to make an exception for Daugherty under its ex-
isting transfer and assignment policies.' 0 The court further ex-
plained:
[We do not read the ADA as requiring affirmative action in
favor of individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring
that disabled persons be given priority in hiring or reassign-
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 899.
133. Id. at 902.
134. Id. at 903.
135. 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
136. Id. at 696.
137. Id. at 698.
138. Id. at 699.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 700.
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ment over those who are not disabled. It prohibits employ-
ment discrimination, against qualified individuals with dis-
abilities, no more and no less.'
ii. Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc. 12 In Dalton, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' request that
they receive permanent positions within the employer's established
temporary job placement program for employees with temporary
disabilities.' The court, after reviewing the statute and existing
case law, concluded that the ADA does not compel an employer "to
abandon its legitimate, nondiscriminatory company policies defining
job qualifications, prerequisites, and entitlements to intra-company
transfers."44 The court expressed the belief that: "The contrary rule
would convert a nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory prefer-
ence statute, a result which would be both inconsistent with the
nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an unreasonable imposition
on the employers and coworkers of disabled employees." 145
The Seventh Circuit cautioned, however, that an employer's
blanket "no transfer" policy might have to give way to the ADA's re-
assignment duty if such a policy unduly restricted the range of jobs
available for reassignment.4 '
iii. Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp. 14 Similarly, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the ADA does not require an
employer to violate its "no roll back" policy that prohibited employ-
ees from transferring from salaried positions to production positions
within the bargaining unit.
148
c. A Middle Position - Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.
4 1
The employer in this case denied a disabled employee's request
for reassignment based upon a long-standing seniority policy.
5 0
This policy was unilaterally established and not grounded in a col-
lective bargaining agreement.""
The Ninth Circuit held that a unilaterally established seniority
policy does not operate as a per se bar to reassignment under the
ADA.'52 Instead, the impact on such a policy should be considered as
a factor in determining whether the reassignment of a disabled em-
141. Id.
142. 141 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1998).
143. Id. at 679-80.
144. Id. at 678.
145. Id. at 679.
146. Id.
147. 120 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1997).
148. Id. at 1225.
149. 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000).
150. Id. at 1108-09.
151. Id. at 1118-19.
152. Id. at 1120.
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ployee would constitute an undue hardship." The court explained
that:
A case-by-case fact intensive analysis is required to determine
whether any particular reassignment would constitute an un-
due hardship to the employer. If there is no undue hardship, a
disabled employee who seeks reassignment as a reasonable ac-
commodation, if otherwise qualified for a position, should re-
ceive the position rather than merely have an opportunity to
compete with non-disabled employees.'5
IV. LEAVES OF ABSENCE
The ADA does not expressly include a leave of absence among
its exemplary list of reasonable accommodations. Despite the lack of
express statutory authority, both the EEOC and the federal appel-
late courts56 have followed the ADA's legislative history"' and rec-
ognized leave as an appropriate type of reasonable accommoda-
tion.158
A literal reading of the ADA would seem to require that any
reasonable accommodation must be effective immediately in terms
of enabling an employee to perform the essential functions of the
job.5 9 Courts, however, have found such a strict interpretation to be
unreasonably narrow and impractical.'" A preferable interpretation
is that a reasonable accommodation is one that "presently, or in theimmediate future, enables the employee to perform the essential
functions of the job in question."'' One court posited that leave
153. Id.
154. Id. The Supreme Court has accepted review of the Barnett decision.
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 532 U.S. 970 (2001).
155. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5447-48.
156. See, e.g., Cehrs v. N.E. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775,
782-83 (6th Cir. 1998); Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 443-44 (1st Cir.
1998).
157. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, 62-63 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 344-45; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 31 (1989) (identifying em-
ployee leave as a form of reasonable accommodation).
158. The notion of a leave of absence serving as a reasonable accommodation
also finds support in studies that have shown that it often is more costly for an
employer to replace an employee than to accommodate a disabled employee
with a leave of absence. See S. REP. No. 103-3, at 17-18 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 19-20. See also Stacy A. Hickox, Absenteeism Under the
Family and Medical Leave Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 50
DEPAa, L. REv. 183, 215-16 (2000).
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining a qualified individual with a
disability as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires") (emphasis added).
160. See Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 655 (1st
Cir. 2000) (O'Toole, J., dissenting).
161. Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995).
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should qualify as a reasonable accommodation if it fulfills two re-
quirements: (1) it must effect or advance a change in the employee's
disabled status such that he or she will be enabled to perform their
job, and (2) "the employee's return to work must be relatively proxi-
mate in a temporal sense."6 '
A. EEOC Guidelines on Leaves of Absence
The EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommoda-
tion and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act
provides several recommendations concerning the scope of an em-
ployer's obligation to afford leave as a reasonable accommodation.' 3
The guidance suggests that:
1. an employee who needs a leave of absence is entitled to such
leave if there is no other effective accommodation and the leave will
not cause an undue hardship;"M
2. an employer should allow a disabled individual to use ac-
crued paid leave first and then provide such unpaid leave as may be
appropriate;
165
3. an employer may not apply a no-fault leave policy, under
which employees are automatically terminated after a certain period
of absence, to deny a request for leave unless either another effective
accommodation is available or granting the requested leave would
cause an undue hardship;
166
4. an employee with a disability who is granted leave as a rea-
sonable accommodation is entitled to return to his or her same posi-
tion unless holding open that position would impose an undue hard-
ship;167 and
5. providing leave to an employee who cannot provide a fixed
date of return is a reasonable accommodation unless the lack of a
162. Garcia-Ayala, 212 F.3d at 655 (O'Toole, J., dissenting).
163. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5447-48.
164. Id. at 5447.
165. Id. The employer does not have to provide paid leave beyond that
which is provided to similarly situated employees. Id.
166. Id. at 5447-48; see also TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at
§ 7.10 (stating that a uniform leave policy does not violate the ADA because it
has a more severe effect on an individual because of his or her disability, how-
ever if a modification of such a policy is requested, an employer may be required
to provide it as a reasonable accommodation).
167. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5447. If holding open the
employee's position constitutes an undue hardship, the employer should reas-
sign the employee to a vacant position for which the employee is qualified. Id.
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fixed return date would result in an undue hardship."
B. Types of Leave
1. Determinant Leave
The least difficult type of leave request is one for a determinate
period of time. This is due to the fact that such a request estimates
a reasonably definite time period during which the employee will be
absent, and the employer can take steps to mitigate the inconven-
ience resulting from the temporary unavailability of the employee's
services.
In order to satisfy the requirement that a leave effect or ad-
vance a change in the employee's disabled status," an employee re-
questing leave typically will need to obtain a medical professional's
opinion that a specified leave period may enable the employee satis-
factorily to perform the job upon return to work.'" According to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the appropriate standard is not
whether the requested leave "is certain or even likely to be success-
ful," but rather whether the leave period could "plausibly enable"
adequate future performance.17' A request by an employee which is
supported by such a medical opinion is a presumptively reasonable
accommodation, but the employer can obtain an independent medi-
cal opinion showing that the employee will not be qualified to return
to work following the requested leave period.'" In any event, the
employer cannot deny a determinant leave request on the mere be-
lief that the employee will not be able to perform the job upon re-
turn, but must have some factual basis for such a belief."
The more difficult issue is whether the length of the requested
leave is reasonable. Where an employee's request is consistent with
documented employer leave policies, the courts are more likely to
find that the leave is a reasonable accommodation. ' On the other
168. Id. at 5448.
169. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
170. Compare Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 151 F.3d 591, 601
(7th Cir. 1998) (finding leave request reasonable where doctor stated he was op-
timistic that lupus flare would be short-lived and request was for two four-week
period of leave), and Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 444 (1st Cir. 1998)
(finding leave request reasonable where employee's doctor was optimistic that
leave would ameliorate her disability), with Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201
F.3d 718, 725-26 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding leave request not reasonable where
employee repeatedly failed to provide medical documentation).
171. Humphreyv. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).
172. Haschmann, 151 F.3d at 601. Alternatively, the employer may deny
the leave request if it would impose an undue hardship. See 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
173. See, e.g., Haschmann, 151 F.3d at 605 (finding leave request reasonable
where employer never availed itself of opportunity to contact employee's doctor
to discuss employee's condition).
174. See, e.g., Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1249 (9th Cir.
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hand, courts tend to find that a leave request that exceeds existing
employer policies is not reasonable.
17 1
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle
Parenterals, Inc.,"76 however, rejected the argument that the ADA
will never impose a leave obligation beyond that provided by an em-
ployer's policy.177 In Garcia-Ayala, the court looked to the totality of
the circumstances and found that the employer had failed to show
that the longer leave period would cause an undue hardship. 1 7 8 The
court noted that the employer failed to present evidence showing
that the temporary replacement employees used during the em-
ployee's absence were either more costly or less productive than the
employee on leave.
7 9
In the absence of a specific leave policy, it is difficult to predict
the temporal boundaries of a determinant leave request. The rea-
sonableness of such a request necessarily varies with the size, struc-
ture, and circumstances of each employing entity.80 Two decisions,
however, have reviewed the pertinent case law, and reported that
the courts tend to view one year as a rational dividing line in deter-
mining the reasonableness of leave requests. In Walsh v. United
Parcel Service," the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that its
review of the case law found no decision in which an employer was
required to permit an employee to take a leave of absence "for well
in excess of a year."'82 The federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York expressed the issue somewhat differently in
stating that courts generally have found leave requests for periods
1999) (finding that employer's benefit policy affording unpaid leave for up to one
year belies undue hardship claim with respect to leave request for a shorter pe-
riod of time); Rascon v. United States W. Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324,
1334-35 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that employer's policy providing for six
months leave with reinstatement rights supported employee's request for four
month leave of absence).
175. See, e.g., Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1045-46
(6th Cir. 1998) (finding leave request unreasonable where employee's absence
exceeded the employer posted policy restricting leaves to a one-year maximum
period of absence).
176. 212 F.3d 638 (1st Cir. 2000).
177. Id. at 646.
178. Id. at 650.
179. Id. at 649. Despite the fact that the court ruled that the leave request
was not for an indefinite period of time, it seems as though the factor that most
influenced the court was the fact that the employer in Garcia-Ayala offered no
evidence of undue hardship. See Pamela L. Hemminger, ADA, FMLA, FEHA
and Worker's Compensation: Selected Leaves of Absence Issues, 638 PL/LIT 663,
718 (2000).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994) (excusing employer from providing a
reasonable accommodation where such would impose an undue hardship on
that particular employer).
181. 201 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2000).
182. Id. at 727.
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beyond one year in duration to be unreasonable as a matter of law.1"
Of course, a shorter leave, even if determinate in length, may be un-
reasonable or impose an undue hardship under the particular cir-
cumstances in question.""
2. Indefinite Leave
At the opposite end of the leave spectrum are requests for leave
for an indefinite duration. An employer in this context faces the
prospect of not knowing when or if the employee will return to the
job."' Despite the fact that the EEOC maintains that a request for a
leave of indefinite absence is a reasonable accommodation, the ma-
jority of courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that
indefinite leave is unreasonable. 7
In Nowak v. St. Rita High School,' " a teacher was absent for a
period of eighteen months, and did not contact school administrators
to let them know when he intended to return to work. ' In ruling
that such a leave was not a reasonable accommodation, the Seventh
Circuit stated that "[t]he ADA does not require an employer to ac-
commodate an employee who suffers a prolonged illness by allowing
him an indefinite leave of absence.""
Similarly, in Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.,' the
employer had no way of knowing when, or even if, the employee
would return to work.9 ' In ruling against the employee, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated "employers simply are not required
to keep an employee on staff indefinitely.., in order to reasonably
accommodate the disabled individual." 3
183. Powers v. Polygram Holding, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 195, 200 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
184. See, e.g., Stubbs v. Marc Ctr., 950 F. Supp. 889, 895-96 (C.D. Ill. 1997)
(finding leave request not reasonable where the employee was working under
exigent time limitations and was hired primarily to complete a specific task).
185. See, e.g., Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1047 (6th
Cir. 1998) (finding that disabled employee provided no indication to employer as
to when she would be able to return to work).
186. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 726 (6th Cir.
2000); Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 1998); Monette
v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996); Myers v. Hose, 50
F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 1995).
188. 142 F.3d 999.
189. Id. at 1004.
190. Id. (citing Christian v. Saint Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051,
1053 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d
755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996).
191. 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1996).
192. Id. at 1188.
193. Id. at 1187; see also Walsh, 201 F.3d at 727 (stating "when the re-
quested accommodation has no reasonable prospect of allowing the individual to
work in the identifiable future, it is objectively not an accommodation that the
employer should be required to provide").
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3. Successive Leave Requests
Employees who have been granted an initial leave period some-
times request an extension of the leave for an additional period of
time. These successive leave requests are a species of determinant
leave in terms of asking for leave of a specified duration. They bear
a resemblance to indefinite leave, however, in that the inability of
the disabled employee to return to work following the initial leave of
absence may raise legitimate concerns about the likely success of a
further leave period. Thus, as a hybrid form of leave, it is not sur-
prising that the courts tend to treat successive leave requests as fal-
ling somewhere between determinate and indefinite leave in terms
of reasonableness.
The reasonableness of a successive leave request is a fact-
intensive inquiry that is best illustrated by example. In Rascon v.
United States West Communications,194 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals found reasonable a request for thirty-days leave in addition
to a prior ninety days of leave. 195 In ruling that the leave was rea-
sonable, the court noted that the employer did not demonstrate that
the accommodation would have imposed an undue hardship.9 '
Similarly, in Ralph v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.,197 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals found reasonable a four-week leave request made
by an employee following a fifty-two week leave period authorized by
the employer's benefit plan.198 In its opinion, the court noted that
the duty to provide reasonable accommodation is an ongoing one.,9
Finally, in Powers v. Polygram Holding, Inc.,200 the federal court for
the Southern District of New York found that a material question of
fact existed in a request for one month of leave in addition to thir-
teen prior weeks of leave. 201
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Walsh
v. United Parcel Service, °2 ruled that a request for leave beyond a
previously granted leave of eighteen-months duration was unrea-
sonable. °2 In its ruling, the court stated that "it would be very
unlikely for a request for medical leave exceeding a year and a half
in length to be reasonable."2' Likewise, in Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola
194. 143 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1998).
195. Id. at 1328-29, 1334-35.
196. Id. at 1335.
197. 135 F.3d 166 (1st Cir. 1998).
198. Id. at 172.
199. Id.
200. 40 F. Supp. 2d 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
201. Id. at 197, 202; see also Cehrs v. N.E. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr.,
155 F.3d 775, 778, 783 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether an eight-week absence followed by a request for an additional
one-month leave was a reasonable accommodation).
202. 201 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2000).
203. Id. at 726.
204. Id. at 727.
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Co.,20 5 the Tenth Circuit ruled that a request for a ten-month leave
in addition to a prior one-year leave was unreasonable. " 6 And, in
Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp.,2 7 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that a re-
quest for a two-month leave in addition to a prior ten-month leave of
absence was unreasonable. ° Significantly, the court noted that the
employee had no way of knowing when he would be able to return to
work in any capacity.
2 9
As a practical matter, the reasonableness of a successive leave
request often will turn on whether it more closely resembles deter-
minant leave or indefinite leave under all of the circumstances.
That determination, of course, necessarily requires a detailed case-
by-case analysis.
4. Intermittent Leave
A fourth type of leave involves sporadic absences typically re-
sulting from a chronic health condition.210 Intermittent leave is es-
pecially burdensome for employers because of the difficulty of pre-
dicting when an individual who requires such an accommodation
will be present at work.
Many courts have addressed the issue of intermittent leave un-
der the ADA by asking whether attendance is an essential function
of the job. Most courts that have posed this question have ruled that
regular and predictable attendance is an essential function of almost
every job.211 This outcome is particularly likely in cases where the
employer has a neutral policy regarding attendance or tardiness. "1
Numerous courts, accordingly, have concluded that an employer
need not accommodate unpredictable absences by granting un-
planned, intermittent leave.1 3
205. 196 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 1999).
206. Id. at 1110.
207. 120 F.3d 1222 (l1th Cir. 1997).
208. Id. at 1225-26.
209. Id. at 1226.
210. Regulations implementing the Family and Medical Leave Act describe
intermittent leave as "leave taken in separate blocks of time due to a single
qualifying reason." 29 C.F.R. § 825.203(a) (2000).
211. E.g., Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th Cir. 2000);
Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 899-900
(7th Cir. 2000); Hilburn v. Murata Elec. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1231 (U1th
Cir. 1999); Nesser v. TWA, Inc., 160 F.3d 442, 445-46 (8th Cir. 1998); Rogers v.
Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996). But see EEOC v.
AIC Sec. Investigation Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1993), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995) (deciding that if a job antici-
pates long hours, weekends, and perhaps working from home, an employer may
have a duty to accommodate unscheduled absences).
212. See Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (10th Cir. 1997)
(citing legislative history found in H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 61-62 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 303, 344.
213. E.g., Buckles v. First Data Res., Inc., 176 F.3d 1098, 1101-02 (8th Cir.
1999); Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Pow-
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This view, however, is not universal. Some decisions have re-
quired an inquiry into the particular circumstances of the employ-
ment relationship before determining whether intermittent leave is
a reasonable accommodation." 4 In Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alz-
heimer's Research Center,215 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that "[t]he presumption that uninterrupted attendance is an
essential job requirement improperly dispenses with the burden
shifting analysis" for determining ADA violations,2" and "eviscerates
the individualized attention that the Supreme Court has deemed
'essential' in each disability claim."21 7 The EEOC2 8 and some com-
mentators agree with the Cehrs court.
C. Interplay With The Family and Medical Leave Act
Any discussion of leaves of absence must include an examina-
tion of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).20 Although the
FMLA statute imposes obligations that are wholly independent from
the ADA, the FMLA leave provisions both differ from and overlap
with the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement.22' Employ-
ers, accordingly, must be careful to coordinate compliance with these
two statutes in handling leave requests.
The FMLA entitles covered employees to up to twelve weeks of
unpaid leave per year: (a) to care for a newborn child or a child
newly placed with the employee for adoption or foster care; (b) to
care for an employee's child, parent, or spouse with a serious health
condition; or (c) to care for an employee's own serious health condi-
tion.222 The FMLA applies only to employers with 50 or more em-
ployees, 22 and to employees who have worked for the employer for atleast twelve months, and for at least 1250 hours during the preced-
ers v. Polygram Holding, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 195, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting
numerous decisions in which courts have found leave requests unreasonable be-
cause "the absences were so erratic that the employer literally could not know
from one day to the next whether the employee would be returning to work or
not or at what time he or she might arrive").
214. E.g., Cehrs v. N.E. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782-
83 (6th Cir. 1998); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Norris v. Al-
lied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1418, 1439 (N.D. Cal. 1996), affd,
Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d 1043 (1999).
215. 155 F.3d 775.
216. Id. at 782.
217. Id.
218. The EEOC stresses that the determination as to whether a particular
job function is essential must be made on a case-by-case basis. See 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(n) (2001).
219. See, e.g., James A. Passamano, Employee Leave Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Family Medical Leave Act, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 861,
877-80 (1997).
220. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
221. See generally Hickox, supra note 158.
222. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
223. Id. § 2611(4).
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ing twelve-month period.24 The FMLA requires the employer to
maintain health insurance benefits during the leave period, and to
return the employee to his or her previous position, or a position
with equivalent benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment following the end of the leave period.'
In some circumstances, an employee may be entitled to leave
under both the FMLA and the ADA. Thus, an employee who has a
serious health condition for purposes of the FMLA-:6 that also quali-
fies as a disability under the ADA2' would be eligible for protection
under both acts. Regulations adopted by the Department of Labor
suggest that an employer must allow an employee in this situation
to take leave under the FMLA first, so as not to jeopardize the em-
ployee's full statutory protection, although it is permissible for the
two types of leave to run concurrently.'
Despite this area of overlap, the two statutes differ in a number
of fundamental respects. First, the threshold requirements for es-
tablishing a "serious health condition" for purposes of the FMLA
generally are lower than those for establishing "disability" status
under the ADA.2 A temporary incapacity lasting four or more days,
for example, may qualify as a "serious health condition," but gener-
ally will not constitute a "disability" unless it is a manifestation of a
more longstanding impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities.23 An employee, accordingly, is more likely to
224. Id. § 2611(2)(A).
225. Id. § 2614(c)(1). If an employee believes that his or her employer has
violated the provisions of the FMLA, the employee may bring an action in fed-
eral or state court for damages, equitable relief, and attorney's fees and costs.
Id. § 2617(a).
226. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). The Department of Labor's regulations under
the FM.LA define a "serious health condition" to include "an illness, injury, im-
pairment, or physical or mental condition" that (a) requires inpatient care; (b)
results in a period of incapacity for more than three days with continuing
treatment by a health care provider; (c) for any period of incapacity due to preg-
nancy;, (d) for any period of incapacity or treatment due to a chronic serious
health condition; (e) for a period of incapacity which is long-term due to a condi-
tion for which treatment may not be effective; or (f) for any period of absence to
receive multiple treatments for a condition that likely would result in a period
of incapacity of more than three days in the absence of medical treatment. 29
C.F.R. § 825.114.
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (defining a covered -disability" to in-
clude an individual with "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual").
228. 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a) (stating that "an employer must... provide
leave under whichever statutory provision provides the greater rights to em-
ployees"). If an employee were required to take ADA leave first, the employee
may lose protection under the FMLA by virtue of not having worked the requi-
site 1250 hours with that employer during the preceding twelve-month period.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A).
229. See supra notes 226-27 (describing the definitions of "serious health
condition" and "disability").
230. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (stating that "temporary, non-chronic im-
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qualify for coverage under the FMLA than under the ADA. 3'
Second, unlike the ADA, the FMLA authorizes leave as an
entitlement rather than as a means to remedy discrimination. '32
Thus, an employer cannot deny FMLA leave on the grounds that it
would impose an undue hardship2 33 or because the employer has a
no-fault attendance policy that is applied in a non-discriminatory
234
manner.
Third, the FMLA regulations expressly recognize that
qualifying FMLA leave may be taken on an intermittent basis.23" 5
The regulations state that intermittent absences needed for certain
types of medical care or for temporary periods of incapacity owing to
chronic conditions are within the FMLA's leave entitlement even
when unplanned and sporadic. 6 The FMLA, accordingly, is more
likely to support intermittent leave requests than does the ADA.1
31
Finally, leave under the ADA may be a necessary accommoda-
tion even when it extends beyond the period mandated for FMLA
leave. 8 The EEOC's Enforcement Guidance states where a disabled
employee has exhausted his or her FMLA entitlement, an "employer
cannot deny the request for [additional] leave unless it can show
undue hardship."23 9
V. REDUCING UNCERTAINTY WITH RESPECT To THE REASSIGNMENT
AND LEAVE ACCOMODATIONS
As the preceding two sections have illustrated, considerable un-
certainty currently exists as to the proper application of the reas-
signment and leave accommodations. A greater degree of predict-
ability is sorely needed. The problems plaguing these two
accommodations, however, are different in nature and, as such, call
pairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact,
are usually not disabilities").
231. See Robert B. Gordon & Christopher L. Ekman, Attendance Control Is-
sues Under the ADA and FMLA, 13 LAB. LAw. 393, 405 (1997); Passamano, su-
pra note 219, at 895.
232. Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712-13 (7th Cir.
1997).
233. Passamano, supra note 219, at 898.
234. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c); see also Hickox, supra note 158, at 187.
235. 29 C.F.R. § 825.203. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently
ruled that an employee who is unable to perform the essential functions of the
job, apart from an inability to work a full-time schedule, is not entitled to in-
termittent leave under the FMLA. Hatchett v. Philander Smith Coll., 251 F.3d
670, 677 (8th Cir. 2001).
236. 29 C.F.R. § 825.203.
237. See supra notes 210-19 and accompanying text (discussing intermittent
leave under the ADA).
238. This is due to the fact that even after taking the maximum FMLA leave
available, an employee may still qualify as a disabled person under the ADA,
and an employer must grant leave under whatever statute provides greater
rights. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a).
239. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5448.
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for different solutions.
A. Reassignment
With respect to the reassignment accommodation, the predict-
ability objective is best fostered through a resolution of the legal is-
sues that currently divide the courts concerning the appropriate
scope of the reassignment duty. This resolution, of course, should be
accomplished with a policy-directed objective of balancing the rela-
tive needs of disabled employees, employers, and other workers.
As to the first two disputed reassignment issues, the courts ap-
pear to be headed in the right direction. The reassignment accom-
modation should not be reserved solely for those who are capable of
performing the essential functions of their current position. This
view would make the reassignment accommodation available only
for those who do not need it. The text of the ADA and its legislative
history support an interpretation that reassignment also should be
available to those disabled employees who no longer are capable of
performing in their current positions, but who would be qualified in
a vacant position that they desire to occupy.24O
Similarly, the emerging majority position with respect to the
second disputed issue is worthy of endorsement. While the clash be-
tween the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
and the reasonable accommodation requirement of the ADA is sup-
ported by legitimate arguments on both sides of the ledger, this is-
sue necessarily needs a bright-line rule. The prevailing preference
for deferring to the seniority provisions of collective bargaining
agreements serves this objective.2 4 1
The third issue poses a difficult choice between filling a vacant
position with a qualified, disabled employee or a better-qualified,
non-disabled fellow employee. Although affirmative action rhetoric
has clouded this debate 2 the ADA's central purpose of helping dis-
abled individuals to participate fully in the American workplace
supports preferring the reassignment rights of the disabled em-
ployee.'
In this regard, consider the fate of each employee if he or she
does not obtain the vacant position. If the disabled employee is de-
nied the requested transfer, he or she is out of a job. Since reas-
signment is the accommodation of last resort, the opportunity to be
placed in this vacant position represents the disabled employee's
"last chance" to remain employed with that particular employer.4
In contrast, the consequences suffered by a more qualified employee
240. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text concerning this issue.
241. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text concerning this issue.
242. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 63
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345.
244. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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who does not obtain the desired transfer are less severe. The non-
disabled worker remains employed in his or her current position,
and the chance to move into a more desirable position is deferred
rather than lost. Given this significant disparity in consequences,
the scale generally should tip in favor of the disabled employee in
the absence of a showing of an undue hardship.
The Tenth Circuit's en banc decision in Smith v. Midland
Brake, Inc.245 provides a useful road map for resolving the fourth re-
assignment issue of when employers must set aside or make excep-
tion to non-discriminatory employer policies. In that case, the court
stated that employers should not be required to abandon neutral
transfer and assignment policies in order to reassign a disabled em-
ployee, unless the policy in question would "essentially vitiate" the
employer's express statutory obligation under the ADA to reassign
qualifying employees as a form of reasonable accommodation.24
This general rule preserves an employer's ability to adopt fa-
cially neutral policies in the management of the enterprise 247 with-
out eclipsing employee expectations that have developed in reliance
on such policies.248 On the other hand, a no-transfer policy,141 or a
policy requiring all employees to compete for vacant positions,
2 0
would appear to "essentially vitiate" the ADA's reassignment obliga-
tion. 1 As such, an employer should be required to make an excep-
tion to such policies in order to reassign a qualified individual with a
disability.
B. Leaves of Absence
With respect to the leave of absence accommodation, the prob-
lem of uncertainty reflects factual more than legal concerns. Here,
the lack of predictability flows less from deep legal fissures than
from a lack of predictable rules for determining the reasonableness
of individual leave requests.
The following suggested guidelines are offered as a possible ba-
sis for enhancing such predictability:
245. 180 F. 3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
246. Id. at 1175-76.
247. A rule recognizing the validity of non-discriminatory transfer and as-
signment policies essentially is similar in nature to the business necessity de-
fense recognized for cases of disparate impact under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (providing defense to claim of disparate impact in which "the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity").
248. Smith, 180 F.3d at 1176.
249. See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999), discussed supra
notes 123-26.
250. Ransom v. State of Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895 (D. Ariz.
1997), discussed supra notes 127-34.
251. Smith, 180 F.3d at 1176.
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1. A leave request generally should be deemed reasonable when
sought for a determinant period of time and supported by a medical
opinion that the disabled employee plausibly will be qualified to re-
turn to work at the end of the leave period;
2. A leave request for an indefinite period generally should be
deemed reasonable only for a period of time that does not exceed one
year and when supported by a medical opinion that the disabled
employee likely will return to work at the end of the leave period;
3. A successive leave request generally should be deemed rea-
sonable only if for a relatively short period of time, as compared to
the initial leave request, and when supported by a medical opinion
that the disabled employee likely will return to work at the end of
the leave period; and
4. A request for intermittent leave should be granted if re-
quired by the FMLA. Given the burdens imposed on employers by
the unpredictability of intermittent leave, the ADA generally should
not compel such leave beyond that required by the FMLA.
5. These guidelines should be subject to modification based
upon evidence concerning: (a) documented employer leave policies;
(b) second medical opinions provided in circumstances where the
employer has legitimate doubts concerning either the employee's
condition or the likelihood that a leave will facilitate future satisfac-
tory performance; or (c) where the employer establishes that the re-
quested leave would result in an undue hardship.
CONCLUSION
The ADA has engendered considerable controversy during the
first decade of its existence. The locus of this debate increasingly is
shifting to the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement.
While determining when and how an employer must provide a rea-
sonable accommodation to a disabled employee frequently is a com-
plicated endeavor, the most difficult questions are posed by the re-
assignment and leave of absence accommodations. These two
accommodations entail a greater restructuring of the workplace
than do other types of reasonable accommodations and place the
heaviest burdens on employers and co-employees.
This Article has examined the current uncertain state of the le-
gal landscape relating to the reassignment and leave of absence ac-
commodations. After identifying various sources that contribute to
the present uncertainty, this Article has made several proposals de-
signed to enhance predictability while still serving the fundamental
policy objective underlying the ADA. Hopefully, these proposals will
contribute to an improved disability accommodation process in the
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years to come.
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